INTRODUCTION
Italy was hit hard by the global fi nancial and economic crisis and there is little sign that the situation in the country is likely to improve significantly in the immediate future. As elsewhere, young people as a whole and prime-age adult men were particularly severely aff ected and, surprisingly, since the eff ects of the crisis were largely concentrated in industry, the impact was felt much more strongly in the less industrialized Southern part of the country, thereby further exacerbating territorial diff erences in employment and income which were already very marked.
In contrast to many other countries in Europe which reacted through the introduction and/or expansion of substantial macro-and microeconomic measures to counter the eff ects of the crisis, the response in Italy has been very limited. Discretionary fi scal stabilization has been almost entirely absent, which, given the relative lack of automatic stabilizerssuch as unemployment benefi ts and, above all, social security benefi ts -has undoubtedly contributed to the relatively poor recovery. The main labour market programme was the temporary short-time working/layoff scheme, the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni. This income support scheme was mainly available to regular employees in industrial fi rms and although this undoubtedly relieved some of the worst eff ects of the crisis on incomes of workers, particularly in Northern Italy, and despite the fact that CIG was broadened in 2009 to apply to other sectors and forms of employment, the relatively limited application of the programme undoubtedly contributed to the territorial imbalance in the eff ects of the crisis.
All this has contributed to form a picture of growing multidimensional inequality: particularly between North and South, between the young and prime-age adults and between the poor and non-poor. In this chapter, Section 2 looks briefl y at the overall characteristics of the crisis as it has
Niall O'Higgins -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:02:22PM via free access manifested itself in Italy; Section 3 then looks in more detail at some of the aspects of inequality in the crisis. Section 4 examines the response of the Italian government to the crisis and considers the extent to which such actions have mitigated or indeed worsened the diff erential eff ects of the crisis. Section 5 provides two case studies of the approaches of fi rms to deal with the crisis-induced fall in product demand and their eff ects on inequalities. The fi nal section considers some of the implications for the future.
SHARP FALL IN GDP WITH UNEQUAL EFFECTS ON DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF WORKERS
Despite fairly extensive reforms in the labour market, initiated in the second half of the 1990s, Italy's growth performance has been relatively weak in comparison to the EU average or, indeed, the United States ( Figure 8 .1) since 2001. 1 In contrast to the overall picture in which it was the previously strongest performers -Ireland and the Baltic states -which suff ered the greatest falls in GDP, Italy had a relatively poor pre-crisis growth record and was (slightly) more severely hit in GDP terms by the Source: Eurostat National Accounts database (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/ page/portal/statistics/). Italy and elsewhere, 2000-2011 crisis than the EU average or that of similar countries, such as Spain. Recession in Italy in fact began early, with signs of faltering economic growth in the last quarter of 2007 (Figure 8.2) . In the second quarter of 2008, however, the recession began in earnest, with GDP falling fast. Looking at the data in this way also gives a clearer idea of the gap between Italy and the EU average. At the low point in the recession in 2009Q2, GDP had fallen by more than 6 per cent in comparison to the fi rst quarter of 2007, whereas in the EU as a whole, the recession led to a fall in GDP of a little over 3 per cent over the same period. In both Italy and the EU as a whole, the recovery began in the third quarter of 2009, although the recovery was signifi cantly stronger in the EU as a whole, with GDP rising by 2 per cent between 2009Q2 and 2010Q2; in Italy, the corresponding rise was of the order of 1 per cent. The crisis hit fi rst and foremost industry (as in other countries), although it is also interesting to note that banking was hardly aff ected at all (Figure 8.3) . Signs of recovery are clear in all sectors save construction, although industrial output in the second quarter of 2010 was still more than 15 per cent below its pre-crisis level.
Figure 8.1 Annual real GDP growth rate in
The crisis has had signifi cant eff ects on employment. However, as one 2007 Q2 2007 Q1 2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2010 Q1 2010 Q2 Note: Data are seasonally adjusted.
Source: Eurostat National Accounts database (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/ page/portal/statistics/).
Figure 8.2 Quarterly GDP (in constant prices), Italy and EU, 2007-2010 (2007Q1=100)
Niall O'Higgins -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:02:22PM via free access would expect, these were not as immediate or as strong as the eff ects on output. Between the second quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2010, employment among Italians fell by a little over 929,300 or 4.3 per cent of the Italian workforce (Anelli and Basso 2010b) . 2 Employment in industry fell particularly sharply, along with employment in commerce (Figure 8.4) . Neither of these as yet show any signs of recovery. Employment in construction fell during the crisis but then recovered, which contrasts with the sectoral fi gures on value added.
Turning to the issue of diff erent contractual forms of employment, in recent years there has been much discussion of the potential role of temporary contracts in facilitating entry to employment.
3 In Italy, there has been a progressive, albeit fairly gradual, move towards the increased use of temporary employment contracts (see Box 8.1), particularly for young people, since the late 1990s. Indeed, most of the employment gains observable in Italy since 1995 were due to the expansion of so-called 'atypical' employment forms: temporary and part-time employment. Between 1995 and 2007, the share of temporary employment rose from 7.2 per cent of all employment to 12.4 per cent, and the share of part-time employment from 10.5 per cent to 15 per cent (Schindler 2009 ).
In a recession, one would expect the initial eff ects of changes in via free access temporary employment to be negative, temporary workers being cheaper to fi re. In the longer run, if the notion of the benefi cial eff ects of temporary employment on hiring practices has some validity, one might expect temporary employment contracts to pick up more quickly than permanent ones. In Italy, as in most EU countries, temporary employment fell during the recession. Indeed, the reduction in aggregate employment in Italy was heavily concentrated among those on fi xed-term and short-term contracts, as well as, to a lesser extent, self-employed workers (Table 8 .1). Moreover, looking at longitudinal data on the issue, the percentage of workers on temporary contracts who managed to move from temporary to permanent contracts within one year fell from a little under 30 per cent to around 25 per cent between 2007/8 and 2008/9. This diff erence is accounted for by an increase in the numbers moving from temporary contracts to unemployment or inactivity, while those remaining in temporary contracts remained virtually unchanged (CNEL 2010) . At the same time, over two-thirds (68.2 per cent) of new hires in non-agricultural fi rms expected for 2010 will be on temporary contracts. Perhaps of more signifi cance, fewer than one in ten (9.7 per cent) of new permanent contracts concern the hiring of workers who were previously employed in the same fi rm on a temporary contract (Unioncamere 2010 Notes: 1) Data are seasonally adjusted.
2) The fi gures report an index of the total number of jobs (2007Q2=100). Italy, 2007 Italy, -2010 Niall O'Higgins -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:02:22PM via free access
Figure 8.4 Employment by sector, seasonally adjusted,
Italy was mainly through reductions, and subsequent increases in temporary contractual forms, accompanied by increases in temporary shorttime working or temporary unemployment under the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG) scheme for those on permanent contracts (in industry). There are also well-established industrial relations. The current collective bargaining system was established in 1993, and postulates a two-tier bargaining structure:
1. collective bargaining at the national (sectoral) level, to determine the terms and conditions of employment (renegotiated every four years) and basic wage guarantees (minimi tabellari, renegotiated every two years); and 2. bargaining at the second (regional or fi rm) level, allowing the bargaining partners to supplement national contracts (valid for four years).
In 1997, the then Minister of Labour, Tiziano Treu, formally introduced temporary contracts and incentives for part-time employment with the so-called Treu Law (No. 196/1997) . The stated purpose of the law was to introduce 'fl exibility at the margin'. In the same year, the public monopoly on employment services was abolished (Law No. 469/1997 ). In 2003 , the 'Biagi' Law (No. 30/2003 further deregulated the use of 'atypical' work arrangements, such as temporary agency work (staff-leasing) and part-time work, and introduced some new forms, such as on-call jobs (lavoro intermittente), job sharing and occasional work (lavoro a progetto).
Source: OECD (www.oecd.org), Schindler (2009) and CNEL (2010) .
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There is little sign, for the moment, of temporary contracts acting as stepping stones to a more stable employment relationship. Due to the reductions in overtime and the extensive use of subsidized temporary short-time working (CIG), which will be discussed further below, hours were also signifi cantly reduced. Between 2007Q1 and 2010Q1, hours worked fell by 4.9 per cent. It is important to observe that those entering the CIG programme are included among the employed, even if the short time is at zero -that is, the workers aff ected are not actually working -as is very often the case. Interestingly, the proportion of those in part-time employment fell by 9.6 per cent between 2008 and 2009, while at the same time the proportion of such employment accounted for by involuntary part-time employment increased from just under 50 per cent to just over 55 per cent for men and from 37 per cent to 43 per cent for women. This refl ects two phenomena: (a) workers on part-time employment, being cheaper and easier to fi re, were more likely to be laid off than full-time workers; and (b) to a limited extent, full-time workers were being forced into part-time work as an alternative to being laid off .
Informal employment 4 also rose during the crisis throughout Italy. In Italy as a whole, the rate of informal employment is estimated to have risen from 11.9 per cent in 2007 to 12.2 per cent in 2009. 5 In the North-Centre, the increase was from 9.4 per cent to 9.7 per cent and in the South from 18.4 per cent to 18.7 per cent (CNEL 2010) . Perhaps the most notable issue here is the pre-existing territorial imbalance in informality, with the South having an incidence which is almost twice that of the North.
The consequences of the crisis have, of course, also been felt in terms of increased unemployment (Figure 8 were included in this calculation, the unemployment rate would have risen to 11.6 per cent, almost doubling the increase (Anelli and Basso, 2010a) . Unemployment had already begun to rise during 2007, before the main eff ects of the international crisis hit. Although the upward trend in unemployment rates was steeper for men than for women -refl ecting, of course, the sectoral impact of the crisis which aff ected industry fi rst and foremost, where the incidence of female employment is lower -this simply narrowed the gap between men and women. In April 2007, the low point of unemployment, the female unemployment rate was 67 per cent higher than the male rate. By April 2010, when unemployment reached its maximum, this had fallen to 26 per cent. In the summer/autumn of 2010 signs began to emerge that rising unemployment had stabilized and for men even started to fall very slightly; however, this has led to the reemergence of a growing gender unemployment gap, which in September 2010 stood at 33 per cent. Although average incomes fell as a consequence of the reduced employment and working hours, so far, the recession has had little impact on hourly wage rates, with adjustment having been undertaken in employment and hours (Figure 8.6 ) rather than in the hourly rate at which labour was remunerated. Some caveats are in order. The data on wages are taken from tax and social security records and so do not record changes due to informal activity and practices. More importantly, the slightly increased wage rates observable in Figure 8 .6 are largely the result of a composition eff ect in employment. That is, the crisis reduced the proportion of lower wage workers in employment and thus led to a rise in average wage rates due to the larger proportion of higher wage earners in employment. Analysis of employment changes and wages in fi rms with at least 20 workers ( Although these data precede the main impact of the crisis, they do suggest that the eff ects on incomes of the crisis are likely to be substantial. We shall return to this below. Italy, 2006 Italy, -2009 
INCREASING SOURCES OF INEQUALITY WITH THE CRISIS

Age and Sex
The fi gures already presented illustrate one fairly universal diff erential eff ect of the crisis throughout Europe: it hit men harder than women because it aff ected sectors with a higher incidence of male employment. In the Italian case, however, this simply reduced the substantial gender gap in unemployment rates that existed before the crisis. Moreover, as noted above, in the latter part of 2010, the gender gap has risen once again, albeit not to its pre-crisis levels.
One may go into this in a little more detail. Looking at percentage changes in overall employment by age and sex (Figure 8 .7), one may observe that the pattern of changes observable in Italy is fairly close to the European average; however, in Italy both positive and negative changes are accentuated compared to the EU as a whole, particularly for females. That is, in Italy employment has fallen more among young people and risen more among older workers than in the EU as a whole. Also observable from the fi gure is the trend towards greater participation in the labour force of older workers -this again is part of a longer-term trend which is also observable to a lesser degree in other countries in the EU. Italy, 2007 Italy, -2010 Looking at the change in unemployment (Figure 8 .8), one may observe the apparent paradox that, in Italy, it is the oldest age groups that have suff ered most in terms of the increase in unemployment and 'gained' most in terms of employment (Figure 8 .7). Indeed, unemployment among older men has almost doubled over the crisis period. The main explanation for simultaneous increases in employment and unemployment among older workers lies in the general trend towards greater labour force participation among older workers in recent years which has been encouraged by reforms in the pension system. It is also true that unemployment among this age group was very low prior to the crisis and so the denominator is very small. The increase in unemployment for older workers in absolute terms was less than for young or prime-age workers. Finally, some part of this may also be due to older workers returning to work as part of a household income generating strategy in light of prime-age (main) wage-earners' reduced income.
Figure 8.7 Percentage change in employment by age (15-64) and sex,
Education
One aspect of the crisis which has raised concerns has been the emergence of educated unemployment; 6 it is not just the low-skilled who have been aff ected. Among young people in high income countries, although there is Italy, 2007 Italy, -2010 a fair amount of cross-country variation, it appears to be those with higher levels of education who have been hardest hit (O'Higgins 2010). For the working age population as a whole, however, this is not the case. In both Italy and the EU as a whole, employment and employment rates have fallen most sharply for those with the lowest levels of education (Figure 8.9) . Indeed, looking at the percentage change by education, employment of tertiary graduates in Italy has actually increased by over 8 per cent (which indeed is very similar to the average in the EU as a whole).
Figure 8.8 Percentage change in unemployment by age (15-64) and sex,
Temporary Contracts by Age
Although, as already noted, the fall in aggregate employment in Italy was heavily concentrated among those not on permanent employment contracts, during the recession, the incidence of temporary employment actually rose quite signifi cantly among younger people and particularly young men ( 
Figure 8.9 Percentage change in employment by educational level (ISCED 0 to ISCED 7), Italy and EU, 2007-2009
temporary employment rose by nearly 5 percentage points, from 40.1 per cent to 44.9 per cent, while the corresponding increase for young women was well over 3 percentage points from 46.4 per cent to 49.8 per cent. Here too, then, the gap between the sexes in terms of the incidence of temporary employment was narrowed -slightly -by the crisis. Since temporary employees were the fi rst to be fi red in the crisis, the fact that the incidence of temporary employment among the young actually increased refl ects the fact that almost all new employment of young people during the crisis has been under temporary contractual forms.
Territorial Inequality: Refl ecting Institutional Imbalances
Italy has the highest territorial variability in employment rates in the EU. The coeffi cient of variation on regional employment rates is 16.3, while in Germany it is 4.8, in France 6.6 and Spain 7.5 (CIES 2010). The crisis has clearly had the eff ect of widening gaps in employment and income. Perhaps surprisingly, given the relatively low industrial concentration in Southern Italy, it was precisely the less developed South which bore the brunt of the crisis in employment terms (Figure 8.11 ). This has much to do with the territorial distribution of production, in particular the concentration of industrial production in the North, and the nature of the CIG scheme which applies principally to industrial workers in fi rms with Note: Data are not seasonally adjusted.
Source: ISTAT database (www.istat.it). Italy, 2007 Italy, -2010 of fi rms (ISTAT 2010b). In the North-West, the reduction in average hours in industry was almost double the reduction in the South (and Centre). Hours worked in services in the South even increased slightly between 2008 and 2009. The origin of the diff ering patterns of response to the crisis -falling hours in the North and reduced employment levels in the South -are to be sought in the application of the CIG programme for temporary short-time working or layoff s, 7 discussed in more detail below. The programme is applicable mainly to industrial fi rms and, since industrial employment is heavily concentrated in the North of the country, this meant that application of the scheme was also much more common in the North.
Figure 8.11 Employment by broad geographical area,
Wages, Incomes and Poverty
Interestingly, given the territorial pattern in employment changes over the period, between 2006 and 2008, average per person equivalent income fell by 4 per cent in both the South and the Centre of the country, while in the North, it fell by around 1.6 per cent. Again, the explanation for this can largely be sought in the greater use of the CIG scheme which, inter alia, implied a smaller loss of income associated with short-time working or temporary layoff s than would be the case for workers who were made redundant. Unsurprisingly, the Gini index also rose, albeit slightly, between 2006 and 2008, from 0.349 to 0.353 on household income and from 0.323 to 0.327 on per person equivalent income. Simulations undertaken by Addabbo and Maccagnan (2010) suggest that the eff ects of the crisis on per person equivalent income distribution are of a similar order in the North and South of the country, although it is worth noting that the income distribution was signifi cantly less equal in the South prior to the crisis. The Commission on Social Exclusion (CIES 2010) has estimated (by simulation) the eff ects of the crisis on incomes and income distribution in Italy. Looking fi rst at the eff ects of the crisis at diff erent points in the distribution on a national basis (Table 8. 3), the simulation suggests that the eff ects of the crisis (including the eff ects of passive income support measures) were fairly evenly spread across pre-crisis incomes. The main losers in income terms seem to be placed in the middle of the distribution with a fall of 2.65 per cent in income. This is consistent with the eff ects of the crisis primarily aff ecting males in industrial employment. One might also observe that, in line with the slight increase in the Gini index, the ratio between average incomes in the fi fth and fi rst quintile widened slightly with the crisis. Turning to the eff ects of poverty by area (Table  8 .4), one may observe signifi cant diff erences in the territorial impact. The table estimates the eff ects of the crisis on absolute poverty rates -defi ned as the proportion of those earning less than 60 per cent of national median income -on a territorial basis. One may observe fi rst of all the huge diff erence between North and South in terms of the pre-crisis poverty rates. One may also observe, however, that the crisis, notwithstanding the extensive use of passive income support measures, signifi cantly raised poverty rates throughout the country, with the rise being more marked in the South (over 2 percentage points) than in the North (1.3 percentage points) or the Centre (less than 1 percentage point). The diff erences between North and South are once again to be sought in the greater use of passive income support through the CIG scheme in the North.
POLICY RESPONSES: FAILURE TO ADDRESS TERRITORIAL INEQUALITY
Macroeconomic Measures: Lack of Expansionary Policy
The most notable feature of the response of the Italian government to the recession has been its absence in terms of macroeconomic measures aimed at counteracting the impact of the fi nancial crisis on economic activity. Indeed, some commentators note the introduction of pro-cyclical measures -which, of course, in a recession tend to reinforce the downward trend in GDP -initially reacting to the crisis with measures designed to increase the overall incidence of taxation (Boeri 2009 ). Certainly, the reaction in Italy was modest compared to other advanced economies -European and non-European (IMF 2010). In 2008, total public intervention to support the fi nancial system came to 0.8 per cent of GDP compared to, for example, 3.7 per cent in Germany, 7.5 per cent in the United States and 18.9 per cent in the United Kingdom (Ministero dell'Economia e della Finanza 2009). The argument was that the Italian fi nancial system was relatively independent of the international banking system and therefore less exposed to the direct eff ects of the fi nancial crisis. Less obvious is the justifi cation of the lack of discretionary expansionary fi scal policy. Perhaps the most important intervention measures adopted by the government have been those taken to try to counteract the immediate restriction of credit by fi nancial institutions following the onset of the fi nancial crisis by making funds available to banks that extended credit to SMEs and strengthening the existing guarantee fund for SMEs.
Micro-level Measures: Passive Labour Market Policies
The distinction between micro and macro measures is a little blurred, particularly since the bulk of the 'discretionary' fi scal expansion has comprised increased use of labour market policies (LMPs). In general, however, the main response of the Italian government in terms of labour market policy measures involved the expansion in January 2009 of the applicability of the CIG (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) fund -essentially a combination of subsidized short-time working arrangements and temporary unemployment -to a broader class of workers (apprentices and temporary workers) on a discretionary basis. Indeed, the CIG scheme in various forms has been the most important income support measure utilized during the crisis in Italy and deserves further discussion.
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni scheme
First introduced at the end of the Second World War, the CIG scheme now exists in three mutually exclusive forms, each of which involves income support for workers who are 'temporarily' laid off or who are working reduced hours.
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria (CIGO)
This is the basic scheme that allows industrial (including construction) fi rms with more than 15 workers to introduce short-time (including zero hours) working for some or all of its workforce in the face of reduced production due to temporary (including seasonal) factors not attributable to the behaviour of the fi rm or its workers. The maximum duration is one year. Workers, who must be on permanent contracts, are paid up to 80 per cent of their base (not including any overtime) salaries by the INPS (the State Social Security and Pension Fund).
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria (CIGS)
This form has a broader applicability. It can be requested in more general circumstancesin the case of fi rm restructuring or reorganization, and/or in the case of a fi rm crisis -and is applicable also to agricultural and service sector fi rms. It also lasts longer, depending on the circumstances and the motivation of the request, up to four years. It also applies only to permanent workers. As before, workers are paid up to 80 per cent of their base salaries.
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni in Deroga (CIGD)
Introduced in January 2009, this form of CIG was introduced with the aim of further broadening the coverage of the CIG, including in particular those in apprenticeships and other non-permanent contractual forms. It diff ers from the other forms in that it is administered at a regional (not national) level and its application and form vary somewhat from region to region according to specifi c agreements drawn up between regional and central governments. Once again, the maximum compensation allowed is fi xed at 80 per cent of the employee's previous base salary.
The CIG scheme as a whole is by far the most signifi cant income support measure in Italy. By its nature it applies to established workers on permanent contracts, thereby further widening the gap between the protection available to permanent as opposed to temporary workers, although this has been modifi ed somewhat with the introduction of the CIGD scheme. As the recession has worn on, both CIGS and CIGD schemes have become increasingly important (Figures 8.12 and 8.13 ). In part, this depends on the relatively short-term nature of CIGO as compared to CIGS, the former being of only one year's duration compared to the four years (in certain circumstances) of the latter. The growing importance of the CIGD depends in part on the fact that it was only introduced in January 2009, but its rapid growth during 2010 perhaps also refl ects the increasing impact of the crisis on sectors outside manufacturing and construction.
As noted above, the geographical distribution of the CIG scheme in its various forms is heavily weighted towards fi rms in the more industrialized North (Figure 8 .14). This largely accounts for the diff erence in reaction in terms of hours and employment observable in the North and South and has remained true even with the growing importance Italy, 2009 Italy, -2010 of the broader CIGS and CIGD forms of the scheme. In March 2010, Northern fi rms accounted for 70.5 per cent of the total hours covered by the CIG scheme, 70.1 per cent of the hours covered by CIGO (the fi rst scheme), 75.3 per cent of CIGS (second scheme) hours and 61.9 per cent of CIGD (the latest scheme) hours. So, although the CIGO scheme has slightly reduced the North-South imbalance in the application of the scheme, the change is minor, especially when one notes that in that month the CIGD form of the programme accounted for only 22.2 per cent of total CIG hours. With the fi rst signs of recovery and the consequent gradual reduction in the usage of the scheme visible since March 2010 (see Figure 8 .12), the percentage of CIG hours accounted for by Northern fi rms had fallen from a high of above 70 per cent to close to 60 per cent by June 2010. In the Centre and South, the usage of the programme has increased in more or less equal measure from around 15 per cent in each of these areas to 20 per cent by June 2010. Nevertheless, the geographical distribution of the application of CIG does not vary greatly between forms of the scheme. In June 2010, Northern fi rms accounted for 66.7 per cent of CIGO hours, 63.5 per cent of CIGS hours and 55.4 per cent of CIGD hours. Thus, the reduced weight of Northern fi rms in total CIG hours is to be attributed to recovery rather than to the broadening of the scheme per se. 
Figure 8.13 CIGO, CIGS and CIGD as a percentage of total CIG hours,
Increased eligibility for mobility lists and unemployment benefi ts
On completion of the CIGS eligibility period, in the case of mass layoff s or fi rm failure, qualifying fi rms' -essentially those which qualifi ed for CIGS assistance -laid-off workers enter the 'mobility lists' where they may stay for a maximum of one (for workers under 40), two (workers aged between 40 and 49) or three (for workers over 50) years. For the fi rst year, the payment is equivalent to that paid under the CIGS scheme (80 per cent of the person's normal full-time wage), after which those still eligible for payment receive 80 per cent of that amount. As a consequence of the crisis, eligibility for the mobility lists was broadened (Mobilità in Deroga) to include some laid-off workers not otherwise eligible for the payment. Two diff erent unemployment schemes exist for agricultural and nonagricultural workers, respectively. The agricultural scheme essentially compensates workers for seasonal unemployment, whereas the nonagricultural scheme is payable for a maximum of 8 months (12 months for workers over 50). Apart from some exceptional cases, the scheme envisages payments of between 40 and 60 per cent of the previous wage.
Firms who hire workers either in the mobility lists or on unemployment benefi t receive a reduction in required tax and social security contributions payable on employees.
Active Labour Market Policies: Training but Mainly in the North
At the beginning of 2010, the social partners, along with regional and central governments, agreed on the importance of improving the usefulness of passive income support measures, and in particular 'mobility' and unemployment benefi ts by combining them with active measures largely involving vocational training. A sum of 250 million euros has been set aside to fund this initiative. Thus far, courses have been instituted on a limited basis, mainly in the Northern regions of the country.
Prior to the crisis, the main form of ALMP was, and remains, apprenticeship. Since a reform of the system in 2003, this takes essentially three forms: (a) apprenticeship for the completion of the duty and right to education -open to those between 15 and 18 years old for the purpose of ensuring that all those under 18 can access some form of education and training; (b) professional apprenticeships aimed at young people aged between 18 and 29 and allowing them to obtain a professional qualifi cation through on-and off -the-job training; and, (c) apprenticeships for higher qualifi cations, again aimed at those between 18 and 29 -this form envisages the obtaining of a higher professional qualifi cation. At the time of writing, the system of apprenticeships is under review and is expected to be reformed in the near future. In each case, fi rms receive tax and social security exemptions to give them an incentive to participate. They are also not obliged (as they would be with a regular working contract) to guarantee a permanent employment contract to apprentices.
Passive Income Support Measures: Positive Eff ects on Incomes and Poverty
Although it is a little early to get a full picture of the likely eff ects of active and, above all, passive incomes policies on employment and incomes in Italy during the crisis, a simple simulation undertaken by the Commissione di Indagine sull'Esclusione Sociale (CIES, Commission for the Investigation of Social Exclusion) on the basis of the It-SILC 2007 sample 8 estimates the remedial eff ects of passive income support measures on incomes. In the fi rst place, Table 8 .5 reports estimates of the impact of the crisis with and without passive income support measures on average quintile income. The fi rst column estimates the change in income arising as a consequence of the crisis on the basis of changes in employment and the usage of income support measures. The second column excludes from the estimation changes arising from income support measures to arrive at an estimate of what would have happened in the absence of intervention. 9 The fi nal column reports the percentage of the estimated income loss without passive income support (column 2) which was recouped by the application of such measures for each income quintile. 10 The table is somewhat encouraging in that the income support measures have clearly mitigated the eff ects of the crisis and have done so in a progressive manner, reducing the income loss to a greater extent (in percentage terms) among those with lower incomes; the estimated loss made up ranges from 43 per cent of the 'no intervention' income loss for the lowest income quintile to 21 per cent for the highest quintile. Having said that, given the substantial diff erences in average incomes between the lowest and highest quintiles, if one looks at the eff ects of intervention in absolute terms, the benefi ts of passive income support were largest for the highest quintile who gained on average 210 euros per person (or 21 per cent of average fi fth quintile income), whereas those in the poorest quintile received an average gain of only 143 euros per person (corresponding to 43 per cent of the lowest quintile average income) as a result of intervention. Analysis of the territorial dimension is also instructive. In this case (Table 8 .6), the table reports the change in poverty rates (defi ned as the proportion of those receiving less than 60 per cent of median pre-crisis income) arising with and without income support measures (estimated in the same manner as before). The table reports the mitigating eff ects of passive income support both in percentage point terms (column 3) and, in column 4, as a percentage of the change in poverty rates which would have occurred in the absence of intervention (column 2). In absolute (percentage point) terms the eff ect of passive income support measures was to mitigate more or less in equal measure the eff ects of the crisis in both the North and South of the country. However, if one sees these fi gures in terms of the proportion of the increase in poverty mitigated, the intervention measures operated more than proportionately in favour of Northern regions since the increase in poverty rates was more marked in the South. This is to be explained by the heavy reliance on CIG measures in providing income support and its predominance in the North. One may further note that the pre-crisis poverty rates were already extremely imbalanced, with a pre-crisis poverty rate of 33.3 per cent in the South and 8.5 per cent in the North. Thus, largely as a consequence of the territorial application of remedial income support measures, the crisis had the eff ect of further widening the already substantial diff erence in poverty rates between Northern and Southern Italy.
CASE STUDIES: ADJUSTMENT STRATEGIES AND IMPACT
This section looks at the approaches adopted by various fi rms operating in Southern Italy to deal with falling fi nal product demand. Restructuring through Naples plant closure In the face of the crisis, the family sought to reorganize and restructure the group and one of the Italian plants, in Naples, stopped production, with the workers entering into CIGS, even though it was clear to all -workers, unions and the A family who own the group -that the plant in Naples would not resume operations. Such a use of the CIG scheme -which in principle is limited to temporary layoff s -is widespread in Italy and is agreeable to all those directly involved since it is the least painful way of eff ectively laying off workers. Workers (and their representatives) accept it because it ensures a longer period of relatively highly paid unemployment. The alternativeplant closure -would see all the workers enter directly into the mobility lists with the prospects of shorter eligibility for income support. If workers enter fi rst into CIG (and the plant remains formally operational, although it is producing nothing) and then, when eligibility is exhausted, the plant closes and the workers enter into the mobility lists, workers eff ectively receive up to four additional years of unemployment benefi ts (under a diff erent name). For the A family, such a solution means that they have less opposition from the workers' representatives to the plant closure. At the same time, as a relatively small family operation (at least in Italy), as a consequence of which they feel a moral obligation towards their Italian workers, they can feel that their actions are less damaging to the workers. It moreover postpones for up to four years the strategic choice as to whether to defi nitively close the plant or not. Workers at the Naples plant were off ered relocation to a plant in the Avellino Province some 50km to the south-west, but most refused due to the transport and/or relocation costs involved.
Family Firms in
Clear preference for temporary workers Until 2008, all the workers in the group's Italian plants were on permanent contracts. However, in the face of the crisis, the Italian parts of the group are hiring new workers on temporary contracts (of six months) as an experimental strategy and an alternative to taking them from mobility lists of unemployed workers. In part, the use of such temporary contracts -a new practice for the group -is due to the current market uncertainty, but it also eff ectively allows a longer trial period for workers (under Italian legislation the trial period for workers hired on permanent contracts is 30 days). Employment of new workers on temporary contracts means eff ectively taking on younger, less experienced employees, but at the same time increases fl exibility for the fi rm by enabling it to fi re them without further signifi cant additional expense after six months. The alternative, hiring workers from mobility lists, means that the company is obliged to issue a permanent contract, but benefi ts from more experienced workers, as well as from a reduction in tax and social security contributions paid by the fi rm (from 32 per cent of the wage to 5.5 per cent) and so labour costs on these workers. Both strategies have advantages but the group feels that the current market uncertainty makes the additional fl exibility associated with temporary contracts more valuable.
Shifting production to Slovakia A second strategy adopted by the group has been to shift production, to some extent, to the Slovakian plant.
Here the workforce is much more easily adjusted, given the much weaker employment protection available to workers in that country. In fact, the Slovakian operations in 2009 accounted for over half (57 per cent) of the group's workforce and 43 per cent of the group's sales. In terms of its usage of CIG for its stated purpose -temporary
Niall O'Higgins -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:02:22PM via free access short-time working -the fi rm has been able to coordinate with the fi rms it supplies, in order to introduce short-time working in its Italian branches in correspondence with the application of short-time working by its clients to cope with short-term lulls in production.
Company B: Adjusting through temporary workers
A company hit by price increases Company B is a manufacturing fi rm producing iron and steel components, such as wire, tubing and so on. Prior to the crisis, the fi rm had been planning to expand production. They had already moved to a two-shift working day and had been looking to increase this to three. The crisis essentially put this process on hold. The major problem arising for this fi rm, too, was the very strong increase in the price of raw materials, and in particular steel, Firing and hiring back temporary workers The fi rm had already been using temporary contracts for some time and the reaction to the contraction of production essentially meant laying off of such workers. Prior to the crisis, out of a total workforce of around 65, around 20 per cent were on ninemonth temporary contracts. Although it did not actually lay off any workers during the crisis, the fi rm did not renew contracts that expired. From May 2009, production was returning to 'normality' and the fi rm started hiring back the temporary workers it had let go during the period of low demand. Thus, Company B used variations in temporary workers -as opposed to CIG -as a means of varying employment (and production) levels. Neither of the fi rms interviewed make use of apprenticeship contracts. One of the major points arising from the case studies concerns the importance of CIG as a means of regulating the workforce and laying off workers, even where there is no intention of restarting production. Used in this way, the scheme has the eff ect of providing relatively generous income support for a relatively long period, but, as it stands, it does little or nothing to actually support either productivity growth among retained workers, or the relocation of (eff ectively) dismissed workers -indeed, the CIG scheme prevents workers on de facto unemployment benefi t from seeking work elsewhere -apart from in the informal economy, since they would otherwise lose their right to the CIG payment. At the same time, as yet, although there is agreement that it should be done, little attempt has been made to utilize periods of down time to encourage training and retraining among the workforce in view of their return to work with the same employer.
The implications of the illustrations provided by these fi rms on the usage of either CIG or temporary contracts underline the notion, already evident from the analysis above, that labour market policy is eff ectively reinforcing a two-tier labour market and that 'fl exibility at the margin' means buttressing an insider-outsider labour market.
Fiat at
Pomigliano: Imposed Flexibility a New Way Forward?
A symbol of Italian industrial success
The Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino -Fiat, for short -is the most important automobile producer in Italy and one of the best known carmakers in the world. The company and its principal owners, the Agnelli family, have been symbolic representatives of Italy for generations. These days, Fiat also owns Maserati and holds an 85 per cent share in Ferrari, along with the Alfa Romeo and Lancia cars which were subsumed into the Fiat car-making operations in the last century. In addition, the Fiat group also comprises commercial vehicle and agricultural machinery construction, as well as component manufacture. These days only a minority -albeit substantial -of the operations of the Fiat group take place in Italy. In 2009, around one-third (64 out of 188) of the group's manufacturing plants were in Italy, accounting for 42.3 per cent (or around 80,400) of its workforce of 190,000.
11 The merger with the bankrupt Chrysler in 2009 will further extend the group's overseas operations.
Also hit by the crisis
As with other car-makers, Fiat was signifi cantly aff ected by the global crisis with after-tax profi ts falling from 1. 198,348 to 190,014. In this context, Fiat is planning its future strategy and, of central interest in Italy, the extent to which the production of new models -and consequently new investments in plant and employment -will be based in Italy or transferred elsewhere in Europe. Refl ecting its symbolic as well as its substantive importance, discussions on the future of Fiat operations, as well as on aspects of its current practices have involved the President of Italy and even the Pope, as well as the Italian government and the leaders of Confi ndustria (the Italian employers federation). via free access referendum was, in the absence of agreement from workers' representatives, to get workers to sign new contracts involving shorter breaks, compulsory overtime on request, penalties for excessive absenteeism and limits on strike action. Fiat's CEO Sergio Marchionne announced to the workers that, if they did not agree to the new working conditions, the production of the new Panda cars planned for the Pomigliano plant would be moved abroad (to Poland or Serbia). The justifi cation cited for the new contracts was essentially the relatively low productivity of Italian plants. In Poland, Fiat produces 77.6 cars per worker per annum, in Brazil 53.2 and in Italy only 29.4. However, it is a little diffi cult to compare the production processes and the comparison is not like with like. Production in Italy is more heavily oriented towards medium range cars, whereas Poland produces exclusively small economy cars. Moreover, Italian plants tend to produce older models; no new production lines have been introduced in Italy for over two years. Moreover, as Marchionne himself has noted, labour costs account for only 8 per cent of total production costs, so it is a little diffi cult to see how agreements such as those presented to the Pomigliano workers will signifi cantly aff ect any real productivity gap that may exist.
In the event, a signifi cant but not overwhelming majority (62 per cent) of the workforce of 5,200 workers in Pomigliano voted in favour of the agreement, in the face of opposition from the FIOM, the union representing the bulk of the workers in the plant. However, it was not until November 2010 that Fiat, or rather the Minister of Welfare (and Labour), Maurizio Sacconi, announced that the investment would be forthcoming for the new Panda model to be produced in Pomigliano, and that production of the model would begin in late 2011. In the meantime, workers at the plant would remain in CIGD (as opposed to CIGS), as had been announced by Fiat in the run up to the June referendum. In doing so, a new company will be formed, FIPO (Fabbrica Italiano Pomigliano), the purpose of which is to ensure that the new contracts do not run foul of existing collective agreements since the workers will eff ectively have a new employer and will therefore not be bound by national collective agreements to which FIAT is subject.
A precedent for future fl exibility?
The referendum and events surrounding it raise a series of issues concerning the future of Fiat, but more generally, the future of industrial relations in Italy. In September 2010, Marchionne extended his 'Pomigliano Strategy', announcing that he would be prepared to invest 20 billion euros in Italy, to double vehicle production in the country by 2014, but that at the same time the workers must accept more fl exible 'US-style' contracts. If they refused, the company would pull out altogether from the country.
Thus Pomigliano may be seen as an opening move in a longer-term strategy of the company. Some have seen the confrontation between Fiat and the unions as some sort of 'Thatcher' moment, comparable to the British government's confrontation with the National Union of Mineworkers in 1985. Maurizio Landini, the Secretary of FIOM, has argued that Fiat is leading eff orts to divide the union movement and dismantle or weaken the system of collective bargaining in place in Italy since 1993. 12 Moreover, Sergio Brancato (FIOM) suggests that other companies, such as Finmeccanica and Indesit, intend to follow Fiat's approach in introducing greater workforce fl exibility, should Fiat succeed. Moreover, the fi nancial and global crisis has seen signifi cant disagreements emerging between the principal workers' confederations -exemplifi ed by the case of Fiat 13 -which are likely to have repercussions for the entire system of industrial relations in the country. In particular, the strategy of the company raises the issue of how contractual agreements can be enforced under current legislation in the face of disagreements among the contracting parties. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The global fi nancial and economic crisis has had serious repercussions for the labour market in Italy. As yet, there is little sign of improvement and it is likely that the crisis will also have important repercussions for the country's system of collective bargaining. In general, the eff ects of the crisis, which have, as elsewhere, been concentrated in industrial fi rms, have been, somewhat paradoxically, more strongly felt in the poorer and less industrialized Southern regions of the country. This has had the eff ect of worsening the already very marked territorial diff erences that exist in employment and income in Italy. In part, the reasons for this are to be found in the labour market policy 'response', or rather in the pre-existing labour market institutions which have not been substantively modifi ed since the crisis began. Labour market policy has been based almost exclusively on passive income support measures and, in particular, the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni scheme which provides income support for 'temporary' short-time working or layoff s. In the face of the crisis the CIG scheme was extended through the introduction of a new scheme, the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni in Deroga. This has extended the application of the measures to a broader range of fi rms and categories of workers, including apprentices and temporary workers. In principle, this should also provide more equal geographical coverage, but since the CIGD form is reliant on regional activation and fi nancial support, so far, the increasing importance of the CIGD (and CIGS) forms of the programme have had very little eff ect on the geographical coverage of income support measures.
The heavy reliance on passive income support measures and, despite stated intentions to the contrary, the integration of short-time working and measures to combine passive with active measures to promote the acquisition of human capital among temporarily laid-off workers, has so far been extremely limited and does not bode well for Italy's long-term recovery. This is likely to be further exacerbated by the rapidly expanding use of temporary contractual forms, as evidenced by the growing proportion of young workers employed on temporary contracts despite the crisis and the case studies which illustrate the use of temporary contracts as a relatively new way to regulate labour demand at the fi rm level. The expansion of temporary employment forms may well, as its proponents suggest, facilitate the expansion of employment, but, given that such contractual forms discourage the investment of fi rms in workers' human capital, may also damage long-term productivity and therefore the competitiveness of Italian fi rms.
The crisis has once again worsened the position of young people in the Italian labour market. They have been particularly severely hit and, at the same time, the lack of career-oriented employment opportunities threatens to have severe long-term consequences. The increasingly marked distinction between heavily protected insiders and vulnerable outsiders has led to increasing age-based inequalities in the quantity and quality of employment and there is the danger of the creation of a 'lost' generation of current new labour market 'entrants'. More generally, there are indications that the quality of work, as exemplifi ed by growing involuntary parttime work and informal employment has decreased and wages -although not wage rates -have fallen.
Clearly, there is a need to rethink labour market policy in Italy with a view to dealing with the longer-term structural issues. At the same time, the emerging industrial relations crisis in the country -as exemplifi ed by the Fiat case study -suggests that the collective bargaining system also needs to be re-examined. As things stand, the absence of constructive structural intervention bodes ill for the country's future prosperity. via free access underlies the relatively low trend growth in the country is at least partly attributable to these labour market reforms which were accompanied by a reduction in unemployment rates from 11 per cent in 1997 to 6.1 per cent in 2007 (IMF 2010) . The types of employment (temporary and part-time) encouraged by the reforms were fairly naturally in lower skilled work. 2. The authors' calculations exclude foreigners working in Italy. Including foreigners, the fall in employment is reduced to 574,336 or 2.4 per cent of the workforce. Anelli and Basso (2010a) argue that excluding foreigners gives a more accurate impression since the fi gures for the employment of non-Italians, which have risen signifi cantly over this period, refl ect various measures legalizing illegal immigrants and formalizing informal employment rather than any real increase in the demand for foreign labour. 3. See, for example, the collection of papers in the Economic Journal, vol. 112, no. 480 .
It might be observed that, of the four substantive papers in the collection, three fi nd negative eff ects of temporary employment (Blanchard and Landier 2002; Booth et al. 2002 and Dolado et al. 2002) , with only one (Holmlund and Storrie 2002) suggesting a (partially) positive role. In Italy, the view appears to be somewhat more positive with several studies (for example, Ichino et al. 2005 Ichino et al. , 2008 Barbieri and Sestito 2008) fi nding a weak positive eff ect of temporary employment on the chances of fi nding permanent employment, although Gagliarducci (2005) fi nds that the intermittence of work experience associated with temporary work tends to impede the transition to permanent employment and Berton et al. (2008) , while noting that the probability of the transition to permanent employment is higher from temporary employment than from unemployment, also observe the existence of strong state dependence or persistence in temporary employment. That is, for young people in particular, there is a tendency towards 'permanent precariousness' with new labour market entrants becoming trapped in repeated short-term contracts. 4. The estimates of informal employment are based on the defi nitions used by the Italian National Statistical Agency (ISTAT) which follow the guidelines laid down by the OECD (2002) . Estimates of the size of the informal economy are derived from Italian national accounts which are then used to estimate informal employment. Here the percentages of employment are defi ned in terms of working days, rather than jobs. 5. In practice, the changes in informal employment reported here are entirely due to changes between . Between 2007 there was no change in informal employment as a percentage of total employment at these levels of aggregation. 6. See, for example, European Commission (2009). 7. Note that, even if workers were eff ectively unemployed -that is, employed on zero hours -under the CIG, they continued to be counted for the calculation of offi cial statistics among the employed, not the unemployed. 8. For a more detailed description of the underlying methodology, see CIES (2010, pp. 81-94). 9. Obviously, these are partial equilibrium estimates which do not take account of any macro economic demand eff ects. In this sense one may think of the fi gures reported, excluding passive income support measures, as upper bounds of the estimates since, in the absence of income support measures, the aggregate demand eff ects of lower average incomes would have been negative. 10. That is, the diff erence between column 1 and column 2 as a percentage of column 2. 11. Although, of course, substantial additional employment is dependent on the presence of Fiat in Italy. Estimates of the derived employment from Fiat operations in Italy vary, but could reasonably be as high as an additional 250,000 workers. via free access following a referendum -similar to the referendum in Pomigliano -at the Mirafi ori plant in Turin, which produced a 50-50 result. As well as encouraging divisions among the diff erent unions involved, the referendum has also fed emerging divisions between workers' representatives in the various Fiat plants.
